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ABSTRACT 
Radio spectrum has become one of the engines of economic growth. However, rapid 
technological change, ever increasing demands for new wireless services and the nature of 
spectrum as a scarce resource necessitate an urgent re-examination of issues such as 
congestion and interference. 
 
This paper argues that the traditional administrative spectrum management approach is 
unlikely to overcome these issues, thereby resulting in growing technical and economic 
inefficiencies. As countries review their spectrum policies - a process that is generically 
referred to as ‘radio spectrum policy reform’ - to counter these inefficiencies, modifications 
to the radio frequency allocations and assignments are beginning to be implemented by way 
of ‘radio spectrum re-farming’. This phenomenon forms the subject matter of this paper.  
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 1. Introduction 
Radio spectrum is a key economic resource that it is at the heart of the modern economy.  
It is central to dynamic new industries such as mobile telecommunications and creative 
industries like broadcasting, but as these and other industries have grown the demand 
that they have generated has placed unprecedented pressures on the radio spectrum that 
is available. Governments have also become aware of the value of radio spectrum, not 
least due to the third-generation mobile telecommunication auctions in Germany and the 
UK. Radio spectrum is no longer a resource to be freely given away for others to profit 
from, but one that can be sold to raise funds for the government. 
Together these developments, which have led to growing technical and economic 
inefficiencies, have necessitated a review on the part of governments as to how they 
allocate radio spectrum. These reviews, which are often referred to generically as ‘radio 
spectrum policy reform’ usually require modifications to radio frequency allocation and 
assignment through a process called ‘radio spectrum re-farming’. This paper focuses on 
radio spectrum re-farming, and asks whether it is able to resolve the emerging technical 
and economic inefficiencies.  
With this in mind, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following 
main section introduces key radio spectrum management issues, and is followed by a 
discussion of pricing methods. The fourth main section of the paper outlines the 
challenges that have cast doubt on the efficacy of the traditional approach to spectrum 
management, thereby laying the foundation for the subsequent introduction of re-
farming in the following section. The sixth main section recounts the available methods 
for re-farming radio spectrum, with section seven focusing solely on administrative 
incentive pricing. In the final section of the paper, conclusions are drawn. 
2. The management of radio spectrum 
Radio spectrum is the distribution of radio frequencies with each frequency representing 
a portion of the radio spectrum. Radio spectrum is a finite but non-exhaustible resource 
(Cave, 2002a:5). It is considered finite because the range of the radio frequencies that is 
suitable for wireless communications is limited to the range from 9 kHz to 3000 GHz 
(Cave, Foster and Jones, 2006:2). It is also non-exhaustible because it is not consumed by 
use; in other words, radio spectrum is infinitely renewable (Hatfield, 2005b:1). When 
using the spectrum for a specific application, the same amount of spectrum can be used 
subsequently for another application. However, what distinguishes spectrum from most 
other resources is the fact that one user of spectrum might have an effect on other users 
– a phenomenon known as interference (Taschdjian, 2006:1). The interference problem 
necessitates a special kind of management to ensure coordination among the various 
users.  
The governance of spectrum use on a global basis is the responsibility of the 
International Telecommunication Union’s Radiocommunication Bureau (ITU-R). ITU-
R’s role is to achieve efficient and economic use of the radio spectrum by all radio 
communication services, including those using satellite orbits, as well as the carrying out 
of studies and the adoption of recommendations on radio communication matters (Cave, 
Foster and Jones, 2006:6). Technical matters are discussed by ITU-R study groups and 
confirmed at World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs). The use of spectrum is 
governed by the Radio Regulations which are updated according to the decisions made at 
each successive WRC (Raisanen and Lehto, 2003:5). 
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 One of the main responsibilities of ITU-R is to distribute the radio frequencies among 
the different radio services. This process is called the allocation of the frequency bands 
(Stine and Portigal, 2004:40). In order to allocate the frequencies, the spectrum is divided 
into different bands (e.g. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) in the 300-3000 MHz band) and 
each band is better suited to certain services compared to others. Relevant services 
include broadcasting, mobile/cellular, satellite, public safety and two-way radio (Stine and 
Portigal, 2004:26). However, the frequency assignment process is the authorization for 
the use of a radio frequency to a user and that is the responsibility of each national 
regulator (Stine and Portigal, 2004:40). 
 
Radio Spectrum as a Scarce Resource 
 
Whether spectrum is truly scarce has recently been questioned and there has also been 
considerable debate concerning whether any perceived scarcity is real or artificial. The 
debate started with the emergence of equipment suitable for unlicensed spectrum as in 
the case of Wi-Fi. Equipment such as cognitive radios is smart enough to distinguish 
between signals and hence does not suffer interference, in which event spectrum reveals 
itself to be not scarce but abundant (The Economist, 2004). Moreover, technologies such 
as Ultra Wide Band (UWB) increase the availability of the spectrum through the more 
efficient use of spectrum that is already allocated (Pujol et al., 2007:48). Ryan (2005, 29) 
argues that the developing of unlicensed equipment, which is capable of providing the 
same services that licensed equipment can provide, has shifted the spectrum scarcity 
paradigm.  
In addition, the scarcity of spectrum might increase as a result of the choice of the 
method of management. It can be argued that the traditional regulatory approach 
resulted in an artificial spectrum scarcity that was not due to any technical or market 
capacity constraints. As noted by Wellenius and Neto (2005:3), “Spectrum scarcity partly 
results from the spectrum management regime itself. Spectrum shortages coexist with 
overall underutilization and inefficient use”. Moreover, in some cases a new service 
which could offer similar performance to an existing service, but at a lower cost, might 
emerge.  
It can be argued from the above that spectrum is not necessarily scarce and that any 
shortage can be ascribed to spectrum access problems where such problems result from 
traditional methods of management that restrict the user’s access to the spectrum 
(Minervini, 2007:107). However, two important issues should be taken into consideration 
when discussing spectrum scarcity: Firstly, spectrum is not a homogeneous resource as 
every spectrum band is better suited to certain services than to others due to the 
spectrum’s propagation characteristics. Some applications may involve a very short 
distance (e.g. a wireless mouse) while others may need a very long distance (e.g. radar). 
Hence, the question is not only whether or not there is enough spectrum for a specific 
application, but also whether the available spectrum is suitable for that application. 
Secondly, it is assumed that new technologies such as smart radio will be able to co-
ordinate fully with one another and thereby avoid any interference. The previous 
discussion ignores the fact that such equipment is complex and expensive. Moreover, it 
would require a long period of time to test such equipment before it can be used in 
public services such as fixed-wire and cellular. In addition, the initial findings of a study 
by the European Commission examining the usage of interference management 
techniques instead of traditional methods such as limiting the technical parameters of 
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 transmitters, suggest that this alternative approach has its own limitations and can be 
applied only in specific cases (Sims, 2007). 
 
Radio Spectrum Utilization  
 
Spectrum efficiency can be defined as the least amount of spectrum that can be used to 
transmit a given amount of information (Federal Communications Commission, 2002a: 
5). The amount of the spectrum has three constituents (International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), 1997: 2): frequency bandwidth, geometric area and time. Fast information 
transfer rates need higher frequency bandwidth. The geometric area includes the 
transmitter and the receiver. The time factor can be ignored if the operation is 
continuous. 
However, the previous definition ignores many factors and focuses only on sending 
the maximum amount of data over the available bandwidth. Burns (2002: 1) accordingly 
approaches the matter from a different perspective via technical efficiency, economic 
efficiency and functional efficiency. Technical efficiency means sending the maximum 
volume of data or voice traffic with a given amount of spectrum resource. The main 
objective of such approach is to distribute spectrum users in a way that does not lead to 
excessive interference. In addition, it aims at assigning the spectrum in a harmonized way 
on an international basis and at imposing specific allocations to ensure ubiquity of 
services.  
Economic efficiency occurs when all inputs are deployed in a way that generates the 
maximum revenue, profit or added value from a finite amount of spectrum resource. To 
achieve such efficiency, the regulator should make sure that the spectrum price reflects 
the marginal benefit. At such a price, supply will equal demand as only the user, who 
gains the most benefit from a spectrum license will be willing to pay that price (Falch and 
Tadayoni, 2004: 205).  
Functional efficiency is measured by the extent to which the use of spectrum meets a 
user’s specific needs in such a way that a particular task is carried out more efficiently or 
effectively than would otherwise be the case (Burns, 2002). In other words, it measures 
how the spectrum is suited to its purpose. An example would be the public safety service 
which private networks can provide more efficiently than the public GSM network. 
 
Radio spectrum management 
 
According to Pogorel (2007b) there are four main dimensions to any spectrum 
management regime, the first of which is allocation. The regulator can either harmonize 
services or permit service neutrality. Harmonization means allocating a frequency band to 
a service or category of services such as Wi-Fi in the 2.4 GHz band (Pogorel, 2007a). 
Harmonization is useful in reducing interference, reducing cross-border coordination 
requirements and reducing the prices of equipment. However, there might be cases 
where there is inefficient utilization of part of a harmonized band (Pogorel, 2007b) 
although it is often argued that harmonization underpinned the success of the likes of 
GSM in Europe so its shortcomings should not be over-played.   
The second dimension is that of technology, which determines whether the service 
used in a specific band is restricted to a specific technology (standardization). Allowing 
any technology to provide a service is called technological neutrality. The advantage of 
standardization is that it allows large-scale production which lowers the cost of 
equipment. However, this might lead to the service being stuck with inferior technology 
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 (Pogorel, 2007a: 7). This dimension is quite critical in cases where there is a choice 
between competitive technologies such as W-CDMA and cdma2000 for 3G. 
The third dimension is that of usage rights, of which there are two options, namely 
exclusive rights or collective use. Exclusive rights are useful in reducing interference and 
in cases where spectrum trading is permitted. However, they could create barriers to 
entry and could underpin the hoarding of spectrum. In contrast, collective use promotes 
innovation and opens up the market for new players but also needs technical restrictions 
as there is a higher risk of interference (Pogorel, 2007a). The final dimension identified 
by Pogorel (2007b) is the assignment method, which includes administrative, market-
based and license-exempt methods. Each of these three methods are elaborated below. 
Regulators could in principle end up with a wide variety of different management 
regimes depending upon the manner in which the above are combined. However, in 
practice, there are three main regimes that have been widely adopted by regulators: 
command and control, market-based and commons (Pogorel, 2007b: 1). A command and 
control regime is usually based on harmonization of spectrum, standardized technology, 
exclusive rights and administrative assignment. A market-based regime is usually based 
on non-harmonization, technological neutrality, exclusive rights and market-based 
assignment. The commons approach is usually based on non-harmonization, technology 
neutrality, collective use and license-exempt assignment. 
Under the administrative assignment method, the regulator decides how the spectrum 
will be used by designating appropriate uses, technologies and users (OECD, 2006: 14). 
The regulator also determines how long the licence will run and its associated obligations 
(WIK, 2006: 8). There are two types of awarding the license under this model: first-come, 
first-served and beauty contest. Using the first-come, first-served method, license 
applications are dealt with in the order of their receipt and the license is granted when the 
applicant fulfils the application criteria (ERC, 1998: 12). It is generally used when there is 
no shortage of spectrum. In contrast, a beauty contest requires the regulator to choose 
the winning applicant via a competitive process using comparative criteria previously 
decided (Hatfield, 2005a). This method is widely used to achieve non-market public 
interest benefits and to address policy objectives that the market fails to ensure (FCC, 
2002a: 36). 
Administrative assignment is considered to be the most effective method when 
international harmonization of spectrum use is required (OECD, 2006: 14). However, it 
usually results in old and less efficient technologies being used in the assigned spectrum 
(OECD, 2006: 14). Moreover, there is no guarantee that the license would be awarded to 
the entity that values it most highly (Hatfield, 2005a: 13). In addition, the criteria used in 
the beauty contest might not satisfy the requirements of transparency and non-
discrimination (WIK, 2006: 11) and it could also be an expensive and time-consuming 
process (ERC, 1998: 12). 
The market-based method was first suggested in 1959 by Ronald Coase who argued 
that auctioning spectrum to the highest bidder was much the most effective method of 
assignment (The Economist, 2004). This method mainly involves spectrum auctions and 
spectrum trading in a secondary market (Baumol and Robyn, 2006) and is held to create 
incentives for spectrum users to apply their spectrum to the highest-valued uses as 
determined by the market (OECD, 2006: 14). In addition, the method may remove 
artificial scarcities arising from the administrative allocation of the spectrum (Wellenius 
and Neto, 2005: 5). A combination of auction and spectrum trading could reduce barriers 
to entry (Cave, 2002a: 20). Moreover, the secondary market could offer auction bidders a 
safety net in case their business proves to be unsuccessful and could also provide 
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 companies that lost out in an auction with the opportunity to acquire a license, possibly 
at a reduced price (WIK, 2006: 13). 
It can be counter-argued that interference might increase between users and that 
harmonizing spectrum bands for contiguous geographical areas could be a difficult task, 
which could, in turn, reduce the benefits from international harmonization and 
standardization (OECD, 2006: 15). In addition, it might allow spectrum hoarding by 
incumbents seeking to restrict competition (Wellenius and Neto, 2005: 6) and there are 
concerns that auctions usually result in raising the value of a license and in delaying the 
deployment of services (Cave, 2002a: 20). Path dependency problems may emerge that 
could restrict future spectrum uses (Marks and Williamson, 2007: 74f). Moreover, the 
method could make it more difficult to impose social obligations on operators (Cave, 
2002b: 126). Hence, the method is generally most suitable for frequency bands where 
scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs associated with market-based negotiation 
of access rights are relatively low (OECD, 2006: 15). 
License-exempt is the assignment method used under the commons approach. In this 
model, the spectrum is unlicensed and owned by every one. License-exempt is often 
referred to as an open or free approach (Lehr, 2005: 3). In such approach, radio 
interference can be considered as a technological problem. Given the availability of smart 
radio and antennas, interference is resolved automatically by the users themselves with 
no intervention by the regulator (The Economist, 2004). 
This should encourage innovation in the development of unlicensed equipment so 
long as it meets with technical constraints such as the permitted maximum transmitted 
power (Hatfield, 2005b: 8). In addition, this approach would reduce congestion in the 
licensed spectrum bands. Moreover, a common approach could enhance competition as 
competitors can easily enter the market at any time and this might help low-income users 
and those in rural areas (Panasik, 2004: 2). It has also been argued that license-exempt 
could be considered to be one of the market-based methods since the market would 
decide which applications are successful, not the regulator (Tonge and Vries, 2007: 89). 
However, when a resource such as spectrum is shared between many users, individual 
users might increase their consumption by increasing their transmitter power in order to 
make more profit. This will cause additional interference to the other users and, as a 
result, they in turn will probably increase their own transmitted power creating yet more 
interference. This case is usually called the commons tragedy (Hatfield, 2005b: 9). 
Moreover, this could lead to an increase in the cost and the complexity of equipment 
(Hatfield, 2005a: 27). 
The problem of interference differs from one service to another. Although 
interference is not acceptable for licensed users, as it would lead, for example, to 
excessive numbers of dropped calls, it might be acceptable for unlicensed users who do 
not pay any fees (Carter, Lahjouji and McNeil, 2003: 46). Moreover, in the license-
exempt approach, the demand is managed by declines in the quality of service rather than 
by price increases (Tonge and Vries, 2007: 96). 
The license-exempt approach is generally suitable for frequency bands where scarcity 
is relatively low and the transaction costs associated with market-based negotiation of 
access rights are relatively high (Federal Communications Commission, 2002a: 36). 
However, in response to the problem that few frequency bands are assigned to 
unlicensed services, a new assignment method has emerged known as the easement 
assignment method which has its roots in the development of new technologies such as 
software radio and ultra wide band (UWB). Under the easement method, the unlicensed 
users with smart technologies use the same spectrum assigned to licensed users (OECD, 
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 2006: 16). The licensed user is treated as a primary user who can cause interference to the 
unlicensed user who is treated as a secondary user. However, unlicensed users cannot 
cause any interference to licensed users and cannot complain about the licensed users’ 
interference. Such an approach could potentially reduce the high transaction costs 
incurred by new users when entering the market (Wellenius and Neto, 2005: 10). 
3. Radio Spectrum Pricing Methods 
The assignment of spectrum is often supplemented by imposing a charge for spectrum 
use. Charging facilitates the allocation of scarce resources and conveys information about 
the supply and demand for spectrum (Mueller, 1982). Moreover, charging is a major 
factor in utilizing the spectrum as too high a price might lead to under-utilization of the 
spectrum while too low a price might lead to hoarding and congestion (Cave, Doyle and 
Webb, 2007: 167). Ideally, charging should be considered as a tool for rationalizing the 
usage of the spectrum and not as a way to gain more income for a country (Youssef, 
Kalman and Benzoni, 1995: 94).  
The difficulty in fixing prices arises from the fact that it is quite difficult to price 
goods that are not traded in a market. With this in mind, the following sub-sections 
describe the three main methods that are used to charge for spectrum, namely, 
administrative pricing, auctions and secondary markets. 
Administrative pricing 
 
Administrative pricing is usually associated with the command and control spectrum 
management approach. In all, there are seven main methods in use: differential, 
incentive, opportunity costs, periodic administrative cost recovery, shadow, spectrum re-
farming and user profit pricing. Each of these sevens shall be addressed in turn. 
Differential pricing measures the difference between the equipment costs of systems 
providing the same service but using different spectrum bands (Nozdrin, 2003: 80). In 
contrast, incentive pricing aims at providing some incentive for the user to utilize the 
spectrum efficiently. It is based on measuring the system performance in terms of the 
amount of spectrum used, number of links, transmitter power, coverage area, 
geographical location and other technical factors: the better the system performance, the 
lower the license fees. The disadvantage of this method is that the choice of values for 
the coefficients in the formula is not based on market needs (Ibid.: 79). In order to avoid 
a large discrepancy between the charge and market value, the incentive price formula 
should be linked to a market valuation (ITU, 2004: 25). 
Opportunity cost is defined as the value of something in its best alternative use. In the 
case of spectrum, it means the alternative value that is foregone when a section of 
frequency spectrum is assigned to a particular user (Taschdjian, 2006: 5). It is intended to 
ensure that decisions by spectrum planners and users reflect the value of the spectrum 
not just to themselves but also to other users (DTI, 2007: 13).  
Periodic administrative cost recovery pricing, which is also known as regulatory 
pricing, is based on recovering the annual costs of spectrum management by the 
regulator (Taschdjian, 2006: 5). The benefits of this method are that it guarantees 
recovery of regulatory costs and usually results in low prices. However, the method does 
not calculate the real economic value of the spectrum (ERC, 1999: 3). In addition, the 
method is unable to send appropriate signals to users in cases where parts of the 
spectrum are more attractive than others (Doyle, 2007b: 1). This method could, however, 
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 be used in the long run if the scarcity of spectrum gradually reduces (Youssef, Kalman 
and Benzoni.1995: 94). 
The economic definition of a shadow price is “a competitive price for a resource such as 
would be established in an open market if there are many buyers in the market, none 
possessing any monopoly power to elevate the price of the resource by withholding the 
resource from the market” (Nozdrin, 2003:81). The method depends on how much 
operators are ready to pay for the right to use spectrum taking into account potential 
profit. As with the differential pricing method, the calculation might be both difficult and 
unrealistic since the potential profit of the industry could depend on many factors other 
than spectrum. In addition, the method does not take into account the alternative usage 
of the spectrum (Mueller, 1982). 
 
Spectrum re-farming pricing is only used in cases of re-allocating a spectrum band and 
cannot be used as a general spectrum pricing method (Nozdrin, 2003: 79).  
In the user profit pricing method, the license fee is based on the profit derived from 
the use of the spectrum. This method allows the regulator to derive a significant income 
from certain services. However, such a method cannot ensure the efficient use of the 
spectrum (Nurmatov, 2001:2). 
 
Auctions 
 
According to Taschdjian (2006: 6), “An auction is a market institution that uses bids 
from potential investors to determine the allocation of spectrum and its price”. Auctions 
are usually used in association with spectrum trading for the initial placement of new or 
recovered spectrum in the market under a spectrum rights regime (Wellenius and Neto, 
2007: 10). The main advantage of an auction is that it gives an accurate method for 
valuing spectrum (ITU, 2004: 15). In addition, the auction process is relatively objective 
and transparent (Hatfield, 2005a: 21). Cave (2002a: 20) recommends that auctions 
should be the default means of assigning licenses to exclusive frequency bands. 
However, there are many limitations to the auction method. Firstly, revenues from 
auctions are not certain. In addition, imposing a minimum bid amount might give 
misleading signals to bidders. If the minimum is set too high, there is a risk that too few 
bidders will apply (ITU, 2004: 15). Auctions are generally used for large blocks of 
spectrum rather than for small amounts since in the latter case prices might end up too 
high (Indepen, 2006a: 38). It could also be argued that auctions allow big companies with 
large financial resources to acquire a large share of the spectrum from which they could 
derive monopoly power (Baumol and Robyn, 2006: 36). Moreover, their use might 
encourage a regulator to maximize revenue to the national treasury rather than to seek 
the most efficient use for the spectrum (Hatfield, 2005a: 23). 
 
Secondary markets 
 
According to Cave, Doyle and Webb (2007: 39), “Trading can lead to a more 
economically efficient use of frequencies. This because a trade will take place only if the 
spectrum is worth more to the new user than it was to the old user, reflecting the greater 
economic benefit the new user expects to derive from its use”. 
There are, however, counter-arguments. The ITU recommendations on spectrum 
pricing summarize four cases where secondary markets would not be feasible, namely 
where: 
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• Some of the government’s critical goals, societal needs or research requirements 
may not be achievable. 
• Rich users hoard most of the spectrum, with the consequence that other users 
would be denied access to the spectrum. 
• Certain band should be allocated to certain uses on a large scale to facilitate 
equipment production. 
• In order to have one standard for a specific service, spectrum for this service 
should be allocated in a harmonized way (ITU, 2004:16). 
 
4. Radio Spectrum Management Challenges 
In recent years many challenges have emerged to cast doubt upon the efficacy of the 
traditional approach to spectrum management. These include the following: 
 
• An increased demand for spectrum due to evolution in communications 
technologies. For example, 3G and 4G cellular require increased spectrum 
bandwidth compared to 2G. 
• Globalization which requires that the assignment of spectrum is internationally 
harmonized to the greatest extent feasible. 
• The increased complexity of interference management. 
• Allocating the spectrum by service becomes increasingly difficult due to 
convergence: most modern technologies provide audio, data and video. . 
• The distinction between fixed and mobile service has become muddied with 
fixed-wire operators attempting to add mobile or nomadic features to their 
service and mobile operators attempting to use low cost land calls and broadband 
as part of their service (Goggin, 2006: 240). 
 
However, two issues stand out. Firstly, new emerging technologies like UWB and 
cognitive radio are threatening the legacy model. Unlike other wireless systems which use 
spectrum in discrete narrow frequency bands, UWB is capable of sending very high data 
rates over a wide frequency bandwidth for short distances (Pujol et al., 2007: 14). In 
addition, UWB equipment transmits at power levels below the noise floor so it 
theoretically has no impact on other receivers although not everyone is convinced. 
Moreover, cognitive radio is a smart device which is able to interpret its environment and 
operate in vacant frequency bands (Evci and Fino, 2005). Although cognitive radio learns 
from experience, its behaviour, unlike that of other forms of thinking radios, might 
become unpredictable (Pujol et al., 2007: 22). Such technologies would force the 
spectrum manager to change the assignment method as the concept of exclusivity is 
totally different in this case. However, it should be noted that exclusivity offers not only 
protection from interference to current users, but also protection from potential 
competition (Goggin, 2006: 241). 
Secondly, congestion is due to inefficiency in utilizing spectrum (Cave, Doyle and 
Webb, 2007: 209). Spectrum utilization inefficiency could exist in two situations (FCC, 
2002a: 16): a situation in which all spectrum in an area is already assigned but not fully 
used and/or a situation in which all spectrum is already assigned and fully used but not in 
an efficient way. The first situation could exist in cases where governmental agencies 
hold spectrum in excess of their needs. The second situation could exist when a user is 
using an old technology and not best utilizing the spectrum. 
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 5. Radio Spectrum Re-farming 
The policy reform process usually requires modifications to the existing radio frequency 
allocations and assignments in order to achieve the new policy objectives. The process of 
spectrum modification is usually called ‘Radio spectrum re-farming’. The ERC (1998: 25) 
define radio spectrum re-farming as follows: 
 
Spectrum re-farming is a spectrum management function and is the physical 
process by which a spectrum management authority recovers spectrum from its 
existing users for the purpose of reassignment, either for new uses, or for the 
introduction of new spectrally efficient technology. 
 
In other words, spectrum re-farming means revising and changing the way the 
spectrum is utilized. According to Indepen (2006a: 54), change could occur in one or 
more of the following: in the application or the use; in the technology used; in the 
technical characteristics of the license such as the frequency bandwidth or the maximum 
transmitted power; and, in the licensee. It is also worth noting that spectrum re-farming 
does not necessarily imply the removal of licensees from one spectrum band to another 
but rather the re-allocation of spectrum in order to achieve greater utilization efficiency. 
Indepen (2006a: 55) highlights five reasons for re-farming the spectrum. The first 
reason is where the benefits from the new use of spectrum exceed those of the existing 
use, whilst the second is that the international harmonization of spectrum may 
necessitate the re-allocation of frequencies. A third rationale for re-farming is where 
existing applications could use spectrum in higher frequency bands but new applications 
could not, with a fourth being that there is congestion in a specific spectrum band. A 
final rationale is where sharing between an existing service and a new service is not 
technically feasible.  
There are additional reasons for re-farming spectrum that can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
• Where a number of inefficient assignments were made in the past and they no 
longer match the demands of licensees or the capabilities of modern systems 
(ITU, 2003:2). 
• Where a new technology requires access to the spectrum in a specific band. 
• Where existing licensees are using an old technology which could be replaced 
with a more spectrum-efficient technology. 
• Where the public sector hoards spectrum beyond its known needs. 
• Where a decision is made by the ITU to allocate a currently occupied frequency 
band to a different service on a regional or global basis (ERC, 1998:25). 
 
At the end of the day, re-farming the spectrum should be considered only if there is a 
potentially higher value use for the frequencies. The benefits of the re-farming process 
are the sum of consumer and producer surpluses plus any dynamic benefits such as those 
that arise from competition, less costs associated with the re-farming process (Ovum, 
Indepen and Aegis, 2006:81).  
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 6. Methods for Re-farming the Radio Spectrum 
In some cases, when the re-farming process involves some forced adjustment of existing 
frequency assignments, the process becomes difficult and requires the consideration of 
all available options. These could include a combination of administrative, financial and 
technical measures (ITU, 2003: 1). Administrative measures could include license 
termination or a change in license conditions, financial measures could include incentive 
pricing or mitigation cost while technical measures could include the imposition of 
sharing in some bands or encouraging the use of frequency agile equipment (ECC, 2002: 
14-16). The four main methods of re-farming spectrum suggested by Indepen (2006a:  
56) are dealt with in the four following sub-sections.  
 
License termination 
 
The license termination method involves either terminating the license or refusing to 
renew the license (ITU, 2003: 5). No financial compensation is required after the notice 
period but lowering the license fees during this period is required in order to support the 
re-farming process (ERC, 1999: 19). This method should be used only in specific cases 
where evacuating the spectrum is urgently required.  
 
Mitigation cost 
 
It is common to use the expression ‘re-farming fund’ when referring to the cost of 
mitigation. The re-farming fund is the compensation cost awarded to licensees if the 
administration reclaims the frequencies they are using (ERC, 1998: 26). Usually, the 
mitigation cost is employed when time cannot solve the congestion problem and when 
the re-farming process has to take place at short notice (ERC, 1999: 19). There is no 
need for the mitigation cost method in cases where spectrum trading is permitted since 
the spectrum will be transferred as a result of negotiation between the existing user and 
the new user (Cramton, Kwerel and Williams, 1998: 1). 
The mitigation cost depends upon many factors such as type of service, type of 
equipment and the occupied bandwidth. Although the most widely available equipment 
should be used as a basis for calculating the mitigation cost, it could be also a factor in 
reducing the total cost because of the potential benefits of using modern equipment 
(ECC, 2002: 21). In addition, consideration should be paid to whether the license is long-
term or short-term and whether the license is about to expire as the mitigation cost is 
likely to be highest when the license is far from its expiry date (Cramton, Kwerel and 
Williams, 1998: 3). 
The first option for calculating the mitigation cost is to take a fraction from the 
spectrum leasing revenue and give it to the licensee. Although this option appears to be 
simple, the revenue from spectrum leasing might not be adequate to cover the mitigation 
cost especially in the case of the public sector – in particular where the military are 
concerned. However, this could be solved by using an auction when leasing the spectrum 
with the reserve price set equivalent to an amount sufficient to compensate the existing 
user. Such a method is used in the USA (National Telecommunications & Information 
Administration, 2002). 
A second option is to calculate the opportunity cost of using the spectrum. However, 
this option could be very difficult to employ in the case of the public sector since the 
concept of opportunity cost is totally different where achieving a profit is not a priority. 
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 SpectrumWise (2006: 60) identify three main methods for the calculation of opportunity 
cost as follows: 
 
• Estimate the cost of using alternative means for the deliver of information.  
• Use overseas comparisons if the same spectrum band was used differently. 
• Estimate the license fee revenue that the regulator could obtain if the spectrum 
was turned over to a new use.  
 
A third option is to calculate the residual value of the existing user’s equipment (ITU, 
2003:10). Although this method is straightforward, it is not without its difficulties since 
investments made in the telecommunication sector are treated as sunk costs, which 
means that the resale value of the equipments is unknown (ECC, 2002: 38). The various 
options for the provision of the re-farming fund are to be found in ERC (1999: 23).  
 
Alternative radio spectrum 
 
The role of the regulator in this method is to provide alternative, less congested spectrum 
and to pay the licensee an appropriate mitigation cost. The difference between the 
alternative spectrum method and the mitigation cost method is that in the latter case the 
regulator is not required to provide alternative spectrum as in general the licensee has 
hoarded spectrum that in excess of needs. Alternatively, the role of the regulator is to use 
incentive pricing and to provide alternative frequency bands where a technology can be 
used. One option is to provide unlicensed spectrum to deploy the same service which 
can be deployed in a licensed band.  
 
Radio spectrum pricing 
 
Pricing could also be used in the re-farming process by way of lowering prices for 
frequencies where there is no congestion and raising prices for frequencies where there is 
congestion (ERC, 1999: 18). The main aim is to induce the licensee voluntarily to hand 
back the license and this process is accordingly known as ‘voluntary re-farming’ (ECC, 
2002: 14). This process often takes 3 to 5 years to be successful (ITU, 2003: 7).  
The problem with this method is the difficulty in moving all the licensees in a 
frequency band at the same time (Indepen, 2006a: 56). However, it could be useful in 
cases where congestion is highly specific (ITU, 2003: 8). It should be noted that using 
incentives to change the behaviour of licensees would only be effective if they were in a 
position to deploy an alternative means of providing a service. 
7. Administrative Incentive Pricing 
The previous section has discussed a range of methods that could be used in radio 
spectrum re-farming. It is clear from the discussion that no single method stands out as 
being superior to the others, with each having their own particular set of advantages and 
disadvantages. Having said this, the optimum pricing method would be one that achieves 
a successful compromise between technical, economic and functional efficiency. Given 
the advantages and disadvantages noted above, such a method would combine the 
opportunity cost method with the incentive pricing method that had been adjusted to 
take into account social factors.  
Incentive pricing based on opportunity cost is known as ‘administrative incentive 
pricing’ (AIP) and combines the administrative and market approaches together. 
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 Licences are issued through an administrative process while at the same time the fees are 
based on the opportunity cost. The method provides an incentive to the licensee to 
return excess spectrum or to use spectrum more efficiently. AIP is intended to ensure 
that decisions by spectrum planners and users reflect the value the spectrum not just to 
themselves but also to other users (DTI, 2007: 13). Pricing spectrum at a value closer to 
its economic value provides a disincentive to hoard spectrum (Smith-NERA, 1996a: 12). 
It should be noted that secondary markets play no role in the re-farming process, as 
secondary markets do not apply in many cases. It is possible that there would be windfall 
gains from making spectrum tradable which would not provide incentives for more 
efficient spectrum use (Ovum, Indepen and Aegis, 2006: 95). However, secondary 
markets could be introduced in a later stage where the regulator would apply the AIP 
fees to the tradable license right. As stated by Office of Communications (2005: 13), 
“Ofcom believes that AIP should continue despite the advent of spectrum trading, as 
AIP can continue to promote greater efficiency”.  
AIP can be considered as the next best alternative to auctions and secondary markets 
in approximating the opportunity cost. AIP has been adapted successfully in many 
countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom. A pricing method 
that is based on the AIP method and is adjusted for social factors would the best 
administrative pricing method to be used in the re-farming process. 
Before applying the AIP method to any service, consideration should be given to the 
purpose, processes, and operating environment of the service. Smith-NERA (1996a: 12) 
assert that AIP is only likely to result in benefits if it induces users to change their 
spectrum use and they note that such changes are likely to be slow to occur because of 
the significant investment in existing technologies and services. Hence, in cases where it 
is necessary to evacuate a frequency band for a specific service such as 3G or WiMAX 
within a matter of months, AIP would not be suitable. In any event, it would be very 
difficult to move all of the users simultaneously. The primary purpose in applying AIP is 
not to achieve any specific short-term change in the use of the spectrum, but to ensure 
that spectrum licensees fully recognize the costs that their use imposes on society (Cave, 
Doyle and Webb, 2007: 201). It should be noted that in cases where there is no 
alternative use for the spectrum, the price should be set solely to recover spectrum 
management costs (SpectrumWise, 2006: 58).  
 
AIP in practice 
 
Smith-NERA is one of the earliest methods for setting AIP values. It was published in a 
study by the Radiocommunications Agency (later folded into Ofcom) in the UK in 1996 
(Smith-NERA, 1996a) and it was applied to two case studies, namely mobile radio 
(public and private) and fixed links (Marks and Yuguchi, 2004: 78). The method is 
designed to calculate the willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum (Doyle, 
2007a: 7).  
Smith-NERA (1996a: 12) lay down four conditions, which if one or more hold true, 
ensure that administrative pricing will not be of value. These four conditions are as 
follows: 
• There is unlikely to be excess demand for the spectrum either now or in the 
foreseeable future. 
• There are political or policy factors which impede the application of spectrum 
pricing. 
• It is not practically feasible to collect license fees. 
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 • There is no opportunity for licensees to change their behaviour other than by 
abandoning their service, and in such an event the spectrum would be left idle.  
 
Smith-NERA (1996a: 24) applied the above to the various services that occupy the 
spectrum to discover where administrative pricing is applicable. Three services were 
found to be eligible, namely satellite, fixed-wire (links) and mobile. This paper is 
concerned with the latter two only. The scheme illustrated in Figure 1 (below) can also be 
used to determine where to apply the AIP method. 
 
Excess demand for spectrum 
in current use or an 
alternative use 
Will spectrum be auctioned? 
Are there policy factors that 
block pricing? 
Apply AIP 
Do not apply AIP 
Do not apply AIP 
Do not apply AIP 
No
Yes
Yes
Yes 
No 
No 
 
Figure 1: Conditions for Applying the AIP Method. 
Source: Indepen (2006a: 36). 
 
According to the authors of the Smith-NERA method, there are many limitations in 
the method (Smith-NERA, 1996a: 39) that are also reiterated in Doyle (2007a: 9) and 
Indepen, Aegis Systems and Warwick Business School (2004: 4). Nevertheless, AIP is still 
seen as the best administrative method in the absence of auctions and secondary trading 
As stated by Cave (2005: 35), “We do not see a feasible or better pricing mechanism for 
promoting efficiency in the use of spectrum that has not been auctioned”. Cave (2006: 5) 
recommends continuing to work with the opportunity cost principle while extending it to 
the inter-relationships between different uses and frequency bands and also to the 
heterogeneity of users within frequency bands.  
The Smith-NERA method was originally developed for the UK, though attempts 
have been made to generalise the method so that it can be used elsewhere. Cave, Doyle 
and Webb (2007: 188) suggest four steps to generalise the method: 
 
• Identify current and other potential uses in each frequency band. 
• Calculate the opportunity costs associated with each use by applying the least-
cost alternative method. 
• If there is a use with an opportunity cost higher than the current use, then set the 
AIP between the two values but towards the bottom end of the ranges of values. 
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 • If there is no use with an opportunity cost higher than the current use of the 
band then set the AIP at the value of the current use. 
 
Given the advantages associated with AIP, a natural question to ask is where has the 
method been applied and whether can common lessons can be learnt? The UK license 
fees scheme is based on the Smith-NERA method (WIK, 2006:87). The license fees 
depend mainly on three factors: location of radio operation, frequency band and 
exclusivity factor (Radiocommunications Agency, 2002). The scheme applies numerical 
factors to take account of various spectrum management factors such as competition, 
choice and diversity, quality of service and spectrum usage constraints (ITU, 2004:92).  
Although the AIP method has succeeded in releasing 28 MHz in the spectrum below 
3 GHz (Doyle, 2007b: 3) and in increasing the regulator’s income by £160 million per 
year (Doyle, 2004a: 3), it is argued that AIP did not have any noticeable effect on 
incentives for efficient spectrum use because the price level was set too low (Ovum, 
Indepen and Aegis, 2006: 93). Eventually, the government agreed in 2006 that AIP would 
continue as a basis for spectrum pricing, that it should be applied more consistently and 
that it should more accurately reflect the market value of the spectrum (Cabinet Official 
Committee on UK Spectrum Strategy, 2006: 4).  
In Australia the license fee is based on the amount of spectrum that a particular 
service denies to other users. License fees depend mainly on the demand for the different 
parts of the spectrum, the population in the geographic areas and the used bandwidths 
(ITU, 2004: 73). The pricing of the denied spectrum is based on the opportunity cost 
(Cave, Doyle and Webb, 2007: 199). 
An incentive pricing scheme, which lowers the fees for users with low transmission 
power and a high frequency reuse factor, is used in Israel. The scheme succeeded in 
reallocating all point-to-point links on frequencies below 960 MHz to higher frequencies 
within two years (ITU, 2004: 81). 
In the United States regulatory fees are intended to recover the cost of administration, 
which is unrelated to market value (WIK, 2006:127). Once the regulator determines the 
administration cost, the cost is divided by the number of licensees to obtain the license 
fee (ITU, 2004:95). 
The Canadian pricing model is called Spectrum Efficiency Incentive pricing and it is 
based on two factors (Connolly, 2006:11): the consumption of the radio frequency 
spectrum and the relative scarcity of frequencies in a given area. The saturation index is 
used to measure the degree of the scarcity of the spectrum in a specific band and in a 
specific area. According to Industry Canada (1996:9), spectrum saturation is defined as 
the ratio of spectrum consumed to spectrum available in that geographic area. License 
fees for high-congested zones are nearly double those of medium congested zones and 
four times those of low congested zones (Industry Canada, 2003:17). 
In a European Union study on the license fees relating to the use of spectrum, it was 
recommended that factors such as bandwidth and the frequency band should be taken 
into account and also that where there is scarcity in the spectrum, license fees should 
reflect the opportunity cost (Burns, Kirtay and Court, 2001:149). 
From the above case studies it can be argued that the AIP method is widely used 
around the world and that it is mainly based on three factors: technical factors such as 
bandwidth, transmitted power and congestion in the frequency band; the opportunity 
cost of using the license; and social factors. The significance given to each of these three 
factors is, however, different between each of the countries mentioned. 
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 8. Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that the allocation and pricing of radio spectrum is 
not straightforward as three sets of inter-related factors – technical, economic and social 
– need to be considered. Through technical advances and ever increasing demand for 
wireless services, the traditional model of managing radio spectrum has been challenged. 
Of particular significance have been the emergence of new technologies that question the 
traditional approach of allocating devices to specific spectrum frequencies on the one 
hand and the congestion that results from the inefficient use of spectrum on the other. 
One answer to the challenges that have emerged is radio spectrum re-farming, which 
entails revising how spectrum is utilized. Whilst there is no single motive in the literature 
for implementing spectrum re-farming, it is clear that at the heart of spectrum re-farming 
is the notion that potentially higher value use will result when it is implemented. 
Although four alternative methods were discussed, it is argued that the optimum pricing 
method would be the one that offers the best compromise between technical, economic 
and functional efficiencies.  
All things considered, administrative incentive pricing (AIP) offers the best 
compromise between these three areas as it based on a combination of administrative 
and market approaches. Moreover, in those countries where it has been implemented a 
social component has been incorporated as well. However, the four conditions suggested 
by Smith-NERA ensure that AIP is not appropriate in all cases. Having said this, where it 
has been used vividly demonstrates the interaction between several technical as well as 
economic factors. This interaction also demonstrates that AIP can be varied in its 
implementation, in other words, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach but rather a 
method that is sufficiently flexible to take into account the specific national 
circumstances faced.  
In conclusion: whilst it can be argued that spectrum re-farming does offer a way to 
address the problems that have emerged with the traditional spectrum allocation 
methods, it is not the method as suggested in the title. Rather spectrum re-farming can be 
regarded as being one of several methods that can be used to address the problems and 
challenges that are emerging as new technologies appear and demand for services 
continues to grow. It is, however, a particularly useful method due to its ability to 
combine administrative and market approaches and is thus likely to be one that is 
increasingly resorted to in the coming years.  
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